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Social Mobility in the Medieval Low Countries (1100-1600)*
1. Introduction
Social mobility looms large in the historiography of the medieval Low 
Countries, because of the reputation of this particular part of Northwestern Europe 
in the perception of historians. The definition of the Low Countries is a controversial 
issue, in which economic perspectives tend to fly somewhat better than political ones. 
Roughly speaking, the Low Countries corresponded with present-day Belgium, The 
Netherlands, Luxemburg, and the northern fringe of France, but it only became a 
distinct polity at the end of the Middle Ages. With the collapse of the Carolingian 
Empire, the region was divided between twenty-odd counties and duchies. Some of 
them came under the French Crown (i.c. Flanders and Artois), and the rest under 
the German Emperor, but in effect, Netherlandish princes were all independent 
from each other and from their liege lords. This patchwork of principalities became 
gradually united in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, when ruling dynasties 
were all replaced in one way or another by the Valois dukes of Burgundy and their 
Habsburg successors, the latter making the Low Countries a distinct legal entity in 
the 1540s. Only then references to “The Nether Lands” of Europe became something 
more than a vague geographical denomination.1
Since the nineteenth century, historians who were moving away from 
traditional political history have defined the medieval Low Countries as a distinct 
socio-economic space in which towns enjoy pride of place. This perspective 
proceeds from the observation that the Low Countries was a composite of diverse 
landscapes, ranging from the coastal flatlands over a strip of fertile loess soils to the 
rocky outcrops of the Ardennes-Eifel mountain range. Within an area of ca. 75,000 
square kilometers, a wide array of socio-economic configurations thus came into 
being, since each region provided distinct ecological opportunities and constraints. 
* The authors would like to thank Chris Dyer and their colleagues at Ghent University 
and Vrije Universiteit Brussel. The research for this contribution was funded by the Research 
Foundation Flanders (FWO) and the ERC Starting Grant nr 677502: STATE – Lordship and the 
Rise of States in Western Europe, 1300-1600.
1. This process is charted in Alastair Duke, “The Elusive Netherlands. The Question of 
National Identity in the Early Modern Low Countries on the Eve of the Revolt”, The Low 
Countries Historical Review, 119 (2004), pp. 10-38.
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Yet, those regions, diverse as they were, were not isolated. As this mosaic of 
landscapes was crisscrossed by the estuaries of the Meuse, Rhine, and Scheldt 
rivers, the exchange of resources, human capital, and expertise between different 
regions was much easier than in many other parts of Europe (in pre-industrial 
societies, transport over water was usually much cheaper than transport over land), 
allowing different parts of the Low Countries to develop complementary positions 
vis-à-vis each other. Thanks to access to the North Sea, the Low Countries were 
also well positioned for long-distance trade with Northern and Southern Europe. 
Combining agricultural economies that produced ample food surpluses with 
excellent conditions for trade and industry, the Low Countries developed a strong 
urban network. In this light, so historians argue, the Low Countries were not so 
much born in the fifteenth century, but in the tenth and eleventh century, when 
the urbanization process set in. This tendency to imagine Netherlandish history as 
urban history was galvanized in postwar historiography, when research revealed 
that, on average, about one-third of the inhabitants in the Netherlands lived in a 
town by the late fifteenth century. Only Luxemburg – the most rural principality 
of the Low Countries – was close to the European average of ca. 10 per cent, 
while in Holland – the most urbanized principality – the corresponding figure was 
a staggering 45 per cent. In this view, high levels of social mobility are suspected 
to have been a key feature of Netherlandish society, since historians consider 
medieval towns to have been “arenas of social mobility.”2
Somewhat paradoxically, the postulate that social mobility was exceptionally 
important to the Low Countries has shielded this topic from focused studies. 
Research on the mutability of social positions has, in fact, followed the ebbs 
and flows of international scholarship. As was the case for scholars in many 
other countries where the French Annales paradigm was influential, historians 
in Belgium and The Netherlands in the 1960s and 1970s were concerned with 
social stratification as a key to histoire totale. The surviving fiscal records for the 
Low Countries were quantified to measure wealth distributions in and between 
social groups, and to develop a cross-sectional view of entire communities.3 
Social mobility was a corollary project, since historians then proceeded from a 
strict definition of social mobility that is still common among economic historians 
today, namely social mobility as the up- and downward movements of individuals 
on the ladder of wealth distribution.4 
2. Martha Howell, “Fixing Movables. Gifts by Testament in Late Medieval Douai”, Past 
& Present, 138 (1992), pp. 3-45: 41. 
3. Most of these studies are discussed in volumes 3 and 4 of Nieuwe Algemene Geschiedenis 
der Nederlanden, 15 vols., Haarlem, Fibula-Van Dishoeck, 1977-1983. For a historiographical 
discussion, see Dire et vivre l’ordre social en France sous l’ancien régime, ed. by Fanny 
Cosandey, Paris, EHESS, 2005. To be complemented for Netherlandish historiography with 
Eric Vanhaute, “Het debat dat er geen was. Sociale stratificatie in de geschiedschrijving”, in 
Docendo discimus. Liber amicorum Romain Van Eenoo, ed. by Jan Art and Luc Francois, 
Ghent, Academia Press, 1999, pp. 229-240.
4. For a recent example of this economic approach to social mobility, see Jord Hanus, 
“Real Inequality in the Early Modern Low Countries: the City of ‘s Hertogenbosch, 1500-
1660”, Economic History Review, 66 (2013), pp. 733-756.
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Yet, for all its merits, this line of enquiry petered out in the 1980s and 
1990s, just as happened elsewhere. Apart from problems with what proved to be 
intractable sources, historians became weary of the assumption that status groups 
could be equated with groups with wealth clusters. Attention to the ways in which 
contemporaries defined and ranked status positions revealed that wealth and 
income levels were only one factor, next to cultural conventions about how wealth 
and income were acquired (e.g. “honorable” and “dishonorable” professions) and 
non-economic variables (e.g. ancestry, privilege, and power as sources of social 
standing). Only in the past decade, a renewed focus on social mobility took shape. 
Armed with insights from the late-twentieth-century Cultural Turn as well as a 
barrage of new techniques, and inspired by British and American traditions rather 
than French ones, Dutch and Belgian historians seek new answers to questions 
that were often shelved decades ago.
Interestingly, this renewed prominence of social mobility on the research 
agenda coincides with several attempts at synthesis (Bas van Bavel’s Manors 
and Markets and Wim Blockmans’ Metropolen aan de Noorzee, both published 
in 2010, and the multi-authored Gouden Eeuwen, published in 2016).5 Taken 
together, these works throw into relief the debates that frame social mobility in the 
Low Countries. Netherlandish historians are a contentious lot, and the root causes 
of social mobility – or the lack thereof – are subject to intense discussion, not in 
the least because social mobility itself has become a somewhat protean concept 
that is defined very differently by historians of different stripes. 
Following the lead of David Herlihy and Fernand Braudel, who both grappled 
with the issue of social mobility after the war, we focus primarily on what sociologists 
call structural social mobility, that is, social mobility that breaks established patterns 
and sets new ones.6 In itself, social mobility was omnipresent in a premodern, 
patriarchal society as a corollary of basic demographic trends, a point that was most 
forcibly made by David Herlihy. On the one hand, prominent families tended to 
have so many children that some of them had to be pushed down on the social 
ladder to preserve the family’s resources and standing. On the other hand, about one 
in five marriages remained childless and another one in five marriages only yielded 
daughters, which created opportunities for others to acquire the resources and status 
of the family that died out in the male line.7 Even the most exclusive groups were 
thus constantly recruiting new blood. The Netherlandish nobility provides good 
examples. In the mid-fourteenth century, Flanders counted ca. 230 noble families, 
5. Bas Van Bavel, Manors and Markets. Economy and Society in the Low Countries, 500-
1600, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010; Wim Blockmans, Metropolen aan de Noordzee. De 
geschiedenis van Nederland, 1100-1560, Amsterdam, Bakker, 2010 and Gouden eeuwen. Stad 
en samenleving in de Lage Landen, 1100-1600, ed. by Anne-Laure Van Bruaene, Bruno Blondé 
and Marc Boone, Ghent, Academia Press, 2016 (an English translation is forthcoming).
6. For an introduction, see Sandro Carocci, “Social Mobility and the Middle Ages”, 
Continuity and Change, 26 (2011), pp. 367-404: 375.
7. See David Herlihy, “Three Patterns of Social Mobility in Medieval History”, Journal of 
Interdisciplinary History, 3 (1973), pp. 623-647. For the estimates for family reproduction, see 
Michel Nassiet, “Parenté et successions dynastiques aux 14e et 15e siecles”, Annales. Histoire, 
sciences sociales, 3 (1995), pp. 621-644: 621.
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but only about one hundred of them survived in the male line until the end of the 
fifteenth century, amounting to 41 per cent of the ca 250 noble lineages attested at 
that time. As a whole, the Flemish nobility had thus remained roughly stable in size, 
as extinct families were constantly replaced through the immigration of noblemen 
and the ennoblement of commoners (respectively ca. 40 per cent and ca. 60 per cent 
of all newcomers).8 Things were no different in Holland. Of the 59 lineages of the 
so-called knighthood of Holland – the institutional core of the nobility – in 1275, 
only 13 still belonged to the 46 lineages that constituted this group in 1475 (28 per 
cent).9 Urban political elites show very similar trends. In Mechelen, an independent 
seigneurial city in Brabant, only three of the 37 lineages that dominated the City 
Council in the 1550s had belonged to the 38 lineages that had ruled the town in the 
1370s.10 In nearby Antwerp, which became the largest city of the Low Countries 
with ca. 100,000 inhabitants in ca. 1550, the turnover was quite similar: of the 
58 lineages that dominated the town in the early fifteenth century, only ten still 
belonged to the 56 political dynasties that are attested for the second quarter of the 
sixteenth century.11
Yet, that the social fabric was constantly woven and rewoven with the threads 
of thousands of individual life trajectories, some upward, some downward, does not 
necessarily imply social change. We would do well to keep in mind the remark of 
Fernand Braudel that, either by force or by their own volition, individuals tended 
to conform to the norms of the social milieu in which they were adopted, severing 
the ties with the milieu in which they were born in the process. In this way, social 
mobility – however life-changing to the people who experienced it – often reinforced 
established hierarchies.12 The nobility of Holland is a clear example: while its social 
composition had changed drastically in the course of two centuries, its profile as a 
rural elite had changed little despite the progressive urbanization of the county from 
15 per cent in 1300 to 45 per cent in 1500. In contrast, in Flanders the recruitment 
pool of the nobility shifted from the countryside to the towns. This rural elite thus 
developed an urban outlook by welcoming ever-larger numbers of aspiring city-
dwellers in its ranks, a type of social promotion that was rare in Holland.13 Towns 
8. These estimates are calculated with the data published in Antheun Janse, Ridderschap 
in Holland. Portret van een adellijke elite in de late Middeleeuwen, Hilversum, Verloren, 2001, 
pp. 429-456.
9. Frederik Buylaert, Eeuwen van ambitie. De adel in laatmiddeleeuws Vlaanderen, 
Brussels, KVABWK, 2010.
10. Frederik Buylaert, “From Periphery to Centre and Back Again: Elite Transformations 
in Mechelen (14th-16th centuries)”, in Urban Identities in the Late Medieval and Early 
Modern City. Mechelen in the 15th and 16h Centuries, ed. by Peter Stabel, Brussels, 2016, 
forthcoming.
11. This estimate is provided by Janna Everaert (Vrije Universiteit Brussel and Antwerp 
University), who is preparing a doctoral dissertation on the Antwerp political elite in the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.
12. Fernand Braudel, Civilisation matérielle, économie et capitalisme, XVe-XVIIIe siècle. 
II. Les jeux de l’échange, Paris, Colin, 1979, pp. 424-425.
13. See Mario Damen, Antheun Janse, “Adel in meervoud. Methodologische beschouwin-
gen over comparatief adelsonderzoek in de Bourgondische Nederlanden”, The Low Countries 
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in Flanders were larger and more powerful than in Holland, and this engendered 
different patterns of social mobility. Social mobility can thus lead to both continuity 
and change.
In what follows, we privilege social mobility that is suspected to have 
provoked change, rather than having preserved the status quo. We will first turn to 
the debate on the interactions between town and countryside. Then we discuss the 
thorny issue of the experiences of urban middle classes in the post-Plague era, and 
we conclude with some brief remarks on state formation as a social process.
2. Social mobility between town and countryside
In the urbanized patchwork of landscapes and principalities that was the 
medieval Low Countries, social stratification and social mobility differed from 
region to region. First, similar processes varied in timing. A typical example is 
the title of knight. Just as in the rest of Europe, this military designation became a 
marker for the nobility, but while this process was already completed in Flanders 
and Holland by the late thirteenth century, this only happened in the fourteenth 
and early fifteenth centuries in Brabant and Namur, and as late as the sixteenth 
century in Guelders.14 Secondly, there were structural differences, with some 
regions developing patterns of economic development and social change that did 
not occur in others. Historians thus commonly imagine the Low Countries as a 
laboratory of history, in which various trajectories co-existed and interlocked.15 
The crucial question that dominates postwar historiography is of course 
about the drivers behind this array of trajectories, and social mobility in the Low 
Countries is perhaps best understood from current discussions between historians 
who are inclined to give primacy to urban growth and its consequences, and 
historians who stress the changes wrought by developments in the rural economy. 
Each tradition has its own theoretical preferences.
The urban perspective is the oldest, largely going back to a series of seminal 
studies published by Henri Pirenne between the 1890s and the 1920s. Leaning 
heavily on Smithian economic theory, Pirenne imagined the rise of the town in 
medieval Europe as the rise of the market. Stressing long-distance trade as a 
uniquely powerful opportunity for capital accumulation and a stimulus for the 
production of manufactured goods, he claimed that the individual towns that 
popped up all over Europe from the eleventh century onwards were essentially 
Historical Review, 123 (2008), pp. 517-540: 521-522 for a critique of earlier claims that the 
Holland nobility had merged with urban elites. 
14. The relevant literature is listed in Buylaert, Eeuwen van ambitie, p. 24. The claim that 
this process implied upward social mobility for knights is widespread in current historiography, 
but also fiercely contested (see for example the contributions of Dominique Barthélemy to the 
so-called Feudal Revolution debate). 
15. For a discussion, see Oscar Gelderblom, Joost Jonker, “The Low Countries”, in The 
Cambridge History of Capitalism, ed. by Larry Neal and Jeffrey Williamson, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 314-356.
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nodes of a single trade network in which raw produce (amber, furs, and so on) and 
manufactured goods (textiles, metalware, and so on) circulated in ever-greater 
volumes over ever-greater distances. New social groups emerged in tandem 
with this urbanization process. As the boatmen and dusty-feet peddlers who had 
opened up trade routes transformed into merchants, they created sufficient access 
to distant markets for a growing number of peasants to become artisans who 
huddled together to make a living at commercial crossroads, either by producing 
trade goods or by catering to the needs of an increasingly prosperous merchant 
class (transport, housing, consumer goods, and so on).16 As those commercial 
settlements increased in size, they developed needs that could only be met through 
the progressive specialization of labor. The rise of merchants and artisans was thus 
soon followed by judges, notaries, bakers, butchers, fishmongers, apothecaries, 
barbers, and so on. Late medieval Ghent, with ca. 40-50,000 inhabitants the largest 
town of the Low Countries up to 1500, for example, counted about one hundred 
different professions, partially organized in ca. 50-60 different craft guilds. This 
arrangement compares well with that of metropolises such as imperial Rome (ca. 
200 crafts for ca. 0,5-1 million inhabitants) or eighteenth-century London (ca. 
350 crafts for ca. one million inhabitants).17 New professions of course provoked 
questions about status. In Ghent, the exact sequence of the various guilds in the 
annual Corpus Christi procession was a constant source of contention, revealing 
contemporary concerns about the constant recalibration of social standing.18 The 
repertoire of status positions – and the scenarios in which one could move from 
one recognizable station in life to another – had become much more complex.
Today, historians are wary of the ways in which Pirenne and his twentieth-
century successors have read this rebirth of urban society through the lens of 
modernization theories from liberal or Marxist bent to develop grand narratives 
about a nascent bourgeois society that was destined to destroy the feudal order 
as soon as its leaders would cease to betray its interests in their attempts to join 
the nobility. Yet, scholars accept that the rise of the towns engendered structural 
social mobility in that towns created options that were rare before the eleventh 
century. In the Low Countries, many thousands left the countryside to move to 
the burgeoning towns, lured by the possibility of a better life. Many of them must 
have found it, especially those who managed to set up an independent workshop. 
Wage earners who rented out their labor on a permanent basis may also have 
enjoyed a social promotion, but their descendants may have seen their purchase 
power decline when the demographic boom of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries 
lowered the price of labor and increased the price of foodstuffs. Others must 
16. The continued impact of Pirenne’s scholarship on Netherlandish urban history is 
discussed in Marc Boone, À la recherche d’une modernité civique. La société urbaine des 
anciens Pays-Bas au bas Moyen Age, Brussels, Université de Bruxelles, 2010. 
17. Henri Willy Pleket, “Rome: A Pre-Industrial Metropolis”, in Megalopolis: The Giant 
City in History, ed. by Theo Barker and Anthony Sutcliffe, New York, The MacMillan Press, 
1993, pp. 14-35: 20.
18. Peter J. Arnade, Realms of Ritual: Burgundian Ceremony and Civic Life in Late 
Medieval Ghent, Ithaca (NY), Cornell University Press, 1996, p. 55.
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have been shunted downwards from the start, when they were forced to join the 
proletariat of unprotected journeymen that could be found in every town. Lastly, 
many of the thousands of young men and women whose move to a town was 
only temporary acquired a higher status when they returned to their home villages 
with the assets they had gathered as house servants or as apprentices in urban 
households and workshops.19 This influx of capital reinforced a process in which 
peasants increased their profits by responding to the demand of nearby towns for 
foodstuffs and industrial crops (hemp for ropes, plants for dyes, and so on). 
Apart from the influx of urban capital in peasant families in the form of 
earned wages and increased food prices, the rise of the towns provoked a relative 
decline in the position of the nobility.20 While many noblemen benefited from 
the increased demand for rural produce, they now had to suffer prominent city-
dwellers next to them whose fortunes rivalled their own and whose aspirations 
to power often went much further than dominating their hometown. The towns 
spawned networks of powerful dynasties that defended the town’s interests – and 
their own – within the principality. The long-run implications of the birth of urban 
political elites are best illustrated by the development of representative institutions. 
While many European polities had a tripartite system of clergy, nobility, and 
commoners, such a system was absent in many Netherlandish principalities. In 
Flanders, popular representation was the prerogative of Ghent, Bruges, Ypres, 
and one rural district. In Holland, the nobility had only one vote, next to six votes 
for Dordrecht, Haarlem, Delft, Leiden, Amsterdam, and Gouda. In Brabant and 
Guelders too, the leading towns leaned heavily on the decision making process, 
next to the nobility.
The debate about Pirenne’s legacy for urban history and social mobility 
currently centers around the question whether his perspective explains the massive 
shifts that took place in the urban network of the Low Countries between the 
eleventh and seventeenth centuries. The first flashpoint of urban efflorescence 
was situated in the south, with booming cities such as Arras, St. Omer, and Douai, 
and in the east, with towns such as Dinant, Namur, Huy, Liège, and Maastricht. 
By the twelfth century, the epicenter of urban growth had moved north, towards 
the Flemish towns of Bruges, Ghent, and Ypres, which in turn lost precedence to 
the Brabantine towns that burgeoned in the course of the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries. Accelerated by the turmoil of the Dutch Revolt, which started in 1567, 
the dynamic core of the Netherlandish urban network eventually shifted again 
to the northbound province of Holland, where the demographic and economic 
successes of relatively young towns such as Amsterdam, Leiden, Gouda, and 
so on, would become an important constituent of the Golden Age of the Dutch 
19. Caution is in order, as the differentiation between rural and urban wages differed 
largely from region to region. In some parts of Flanders, urban wages had an edge of ca. 50-70 
per cent over rural wages, whereas in nearby Holland, this gap was close to nonexistent (Van 
Bavel, Manors and Markets, p. 211).
20. For the Low Countries, this was first argued in Raymond Van Uytven, “Vorst, adel en 
steden: een driehoeksverhouding in Brabant van de twaalfde tot de zestiende eeuw”, Bijdragen 
tot de Geschiedenis, 59 (1976), pp. 93-122.
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Republic. This process had implications for the social fabric, as opportunities for 
upward social mobility must have followed economic growth. In regions that had 
lost primacy, the urban network did not collapse, but in Flanders, for example, the 
level of urbanization dropped from ca. 33-36 per cent to ca. 24-25 per cent in the 
course of the fifteenth century. This decline suggests that access to urban venues 
to social mobility became more constricted over time.
Today, urban historians recognize that the structural resilience of the 
Netherlandish urban network had much to do with local and regional demand 
(most urban goods and services were not exported, but consumed locally). 
Yet, they also continue the Pirennian tradition of urban historiography, with its 
Smithian foundations, as they situate the root causes of these momentous shifts 
in the urban network with long-distance trade. Three elements stand out. The 
first factor was increasing competition by other players in the international trade 
circuit. England, for example, shifted from the export of unprocessed wool to 
(half-)finished textiles, thus threatening Flemish textile industries that used 
English wool, while stimulating Brabantine towns that specialized in finishing 
English cloth. The second factor was the shifting demands in distant markets, 
which constantly forced individual towns to reinvent themselves as centers of 
industrial production to meet changing fashions. Successful examples are late 
medieval Bruges and Malines, which gradually abandoned the production of 
heavy woolens that had propelled the urban economy in the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries in favor of a wide array of luxury industries (top-notch cloth, gilded 
leather, illuminated manuscripts, tapestries, and so on). A notorious failure, 
then, was Ypres, where the population plummeted from ca. 30,000 inhabitants 
in the fourteenth century to ca. 8,000 inhabitants in the late fifteenth century. 
In this view, the successive efflorescence of the urban networks of Brabant and 
Holland is explained by their focused catering to the burgeoning middle classes 
of Late Medieval Europe (medium-quality cloth, bricks, meat, butter, cheese, 
beer, and so on), a market that was not so easily claimed by Flemish towns that 
had progressively targeted the international markets for luxuries. The third factor 
was the shifts in international trade circuits. The consolidation of stable states 
that progressively shielded long-distance trade from the risks of war and robbery 
made transport over land sufficiently cheap to be a viable alternative to transport 
by sea.21 This development doomed Bruges as the trade emporium of the Low 
Countries, dependent as it was of sea trade with Italy, in favor of Antwerp, a 
town that was closer to the land route that, by way of Cologne, connected the 
Low Countries with continental Europe.22 Similarly, the development of Baltic 
trade networks, next to the older ones that originated in the Mediterranean, was 
the driver behind the rise of Amsterdam, the town that succeeded Antwerp as the 
gateway city for international trade in the Low Countries.
21. See esp. Stephan Epstein, Freedom and Growth: The Rise of States and Markets in 
Europe, 1300-1750, London, Routledge, 2000.
22. For this paradigm, see esp. Blockmans, Metropolen, pp. 107-124, 205-209, 236-263, 
293-295, 532-533, 545-556, 565-583 and 650-655, and chapters 2 and 3 of Gouden eeuwen, 
esp. pp. 37-63, 69-70, 103-104.
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The recent experiments to frame Netherlandish history through the lens of 
New Institutional Economics can also be situated in this paradigm, since this line 
of enquiry builds on Smithian precepts about commercialization and specialization 
of labor.23 In this view, the relocation of international trade from Bruges over 
Antwerp to Amsterdam is not so much understood as a result of shifts in demand 
and transport, but rather as the outcome of competitive attempts of towns to create 
the most favorable legal regime for long-distance trade, and so to lure foreign 
capital and expertise.24
Taken together, the diverse strands of scholarship that focus on town-based 
trade provide a perspective on social mobility that is curiously unbalanced: the 
agency of individuals and groups to achieve social promotion, or at least, to 
cement established status positions, is either presumed to be close to nonexistent, 
or very great. On the one hand, entire groups could be lifted up or cast down by 
developments that took shape in distant markets, far away from the Low Countries. 
On the other hand, what was often decisive were the choices of individual producers 
and entrepreneurs or that of entire groups and institutions (e.g. craft guilds), taken 
anew day after day, year after year, in response to the ever-shifting panoply of 
opportunities and threats that stemmed from international markets. These choices 
either led to success or doom. This attention to agency as a contingent factor 
in the fates of individuals, households, economic sectors, or even entire towns, 
provides a strong contrast with a historiographical paradigm that proceeds from 
a rural perspective on the various trajectories of Netherlandish regions. In this 
view, patterns of social mobility are coherently structured by socio-economic 
configurations that tend to petrify over time.
This alternative to (neo-)Smithian approaches has some of its roots in postwar 
critiques of Pirenne’s model to explain urban growth. A first crack appeared when 
historians noted that the commercial and political elites that emerged with the towns 
did not spring from footloose peddlers, but from prominent families with deep 
roots in local society – that is, bailiffs and stewards of noble lords or ecclesiastical 
powerhouses, wealthy landowners, or even petty noblemen.25 This observation 
pushed historians to reconsider the importance of local and regional trade for the 
rise of the towns, a factor that was long considered to be negligible in light of the 
exceptional profit margins of long-distance trade. The urbanization of medieval 
Europe was thus reimagined as a gradual process that stretched back to the ninth and 
tenth centuries, in which towns not only thrived as nodes in a web of trade relations, 
but also because of the need for concentration of labor to establish effective defenses 
23. See the incisive comments in Peer Vries, “Global Economic History: A Survey”, in 
The Oxford History of Historical Writing, ed. by Axel Schneider, Daniel Woolf and Ian Hasketh, 
5 vols., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, vol. 5, pp. 113-135: 114.
24. Oscar Gelderblom, Cities of Commerce. The Institutional Foundations of International 
Trade in the Low Countries, 1250-1650, Princeton (NJ), Princeton University Press, 2013. See 
also the debate about this monograph that is published in The Low Countries Journal of Social 
and Economic History, 11 (2014). 
25. The seminal study is Arthur Hibbert, “The Origins of the Medieval Town Patriciate”, 
Past & Present, 3 (1953), pp. 15-27.
Frederik Buylaert - Sam Geens86
in wartime (e.g. the fortress against Viking incursions around which the town of 
Middelburg in Zeeland developed), or local stimuli to respond to the consumer 
demands of aristocratic households, episcopal palaces, or monasteries.26 
While these revisions are all commonly accepted among urban historians, 
they also created breathing space for approaches that saw towns not primarily as 
an agent of change, but as its product. The redefinition of the town as something 
that was embedded in the rural economy, rather than as an islet in a feudal sea that 
was buoyed up by long-distance trade, shifted the focus to agricultural production. 
While the towns in Holland and Flanders increasingly relied on international trade 
for their grain supply, most towns, so some historians claim, continued to rely on 
their hinterlands for foodstuffs, raw produce, and immigrants. In this view, the 
shifts in the urban network – from twelfth-century Arras to seventeenth-century 
Amsterdam – did not primarily reflect shifts in international markets, but the different 
organization of rural economies in various regions of the Low Countries.27
The dominant perspective to understand the rural constraints of urban 
development is neo-Marxist, rather than neo-Smithian. Building on Robert 
Brenner’s seminal essays, most rural historians agree that a region’s potential for 
urbanization was shaped by its social-property-regime, that is, the accepted set of 
rules about the ownership and use of land. Every region was positioned between 
two opposite scenario’s. 
In one scenario, small peasants dominated the use of land. Extreme examples 
are the Veluwe and Campine areas (respectively in Guelders and Brabant), 
where small peasants controlled small plots of land, and in which trends towards 
market-oriented specialization and the adoption of capital-intensive, technical 
innovations were blocked to protect the interests of the peasantry. The level of 
commercialization and urbanization was relatively low, and these regions saw 
little growth until the modern era. A less extreme variant of this scenario was 
inland Flanders, which was caught in a high-equilibrium trap. Here, small-scale 
peasants were market-oriented, thus allowing considerable urbanization, while 
simultaneously putting a cap on that urbanization process by favoring labor-
intensive innovation over capital-intensive innovation. 
The other scenario is that of the rise of agrarian capitalism. In some regions, 
large-scale landowners had retained or claimed full ownership of the land at the 
expense of the traditional rights to the use of land by peasants (classic examples are 
grazing and wood-gathering on common lands). Here, the exploitation of the land 
was increasingly organized in large-scale farms that were delegated through short-
term leases to farmers, that is, agricultural specialists who did not own land of their 
own, but who had sufficient capital to implement new techniques that increased 
production and saved on expenditures for hired labor. As the competition for lease 
contracts between farmers pushed them to tailor production to the demands of 
the market, these regions developed performant agricultural economies that could 
carry urbanization up to a very high level. This property regime was established 
26. A synthesis for the Low Countries: Adriaan Verhulst, The Rise of Cities in North-West 
Europe, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999.
27. See esp. Van Bavel, Manors and Markets, p. 384.
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early in the Guelders Riverlands and Coastal Frisia, where three-quarters of 
the land was controlled by large-scale landowners. Those regions were joined 
by Coastal Flanders in the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries, as a combination of 
circumstances forced the hitherto dominant group of small-scale peasants to sell 
their plots of land to individuals who managed to cobble together considerable 
properties. In Romboutswerve, a locality near the town of Damme, for example, 
there were 128 owners with a plot of land of less than 5 hectare in 1456, but this 
number had dropped to 55 by 1545. In this period, the number of large landowners 
that owned more than 25 hectare of land had increased from one to four.28 Holland 
saw a similar transition. In the late Middle Ages, peasants controlled about two-
thirds of the land, but, as they were ruined by the ravages of the Dutch Revolt, they 
were replaced by an exclusive group of wealthy urban investors who delegated 
the daily management to farmers-entrepreneurs. As the modernization of the rural 
economy implied that all former peasants who were not needed as hired laborers 
were forced to find a living in the towns, this development helps to explain why 
the urbanization of Holland rose from the already exceptional figure of 45 per cent 
in 1550 to 55 per cent in 1622.29
It remains to be seen whether this view on urban society as the product of 
regional property regimes can replace the older paradigm that stresses the interplay 
between urban networks and international trade. It is striking, for example, that 
the stagnation of the urbanization process in Flanders in the course of the fifteenth 
century coincides with the progressive urbanization of Holland (from 33 per cent 
in 1400 to 45 per cent in 1500), while both regions were still largely dominated 
by peasant societies. Yet, while the economic debate is as yet unsettled, rural 
historians have revealed that social mobility was not exclusively tied to towns.
In those regions where peasant managed to protect the established property 
regime, social mobility was not absent, since local communities constantly 
adapted to new demographic and economic trends (e.g. changes in fertility and 
mortality regimes, proto-industrialization, and so on). In those regions where an 
increasing number of peasants was parted from their farm, the dominant trend 
must have been downward social mobility, as those expropriated peasants faced 
a difficult choice. They could move into a town, which was risky as it subjected 
them to the full force of grain markets that, in times of harvest failure, were 
sufficiently volatile to ruin skilled craftsmen, let alone untrained laborers.30 Or 
they could make an insecure living by renting out their labor to wealthy peasants 
and the farmers who leased large plots of lands from big landowners. Bas van 
28. This was first observed in Paul Vandewalle, De geschiedenis van de landbouw in de 
kasselrij Veurne, Brussels, Gemeentekrediet van België, 1986, pp. 116-117, 120-122, 383, 387-
388 and expanded in Tim Soens, De spade in de dijk? Waterbeheer en rurale samenleving in 
de Vlaamse kustvlakte (1280-1580), Ghent, Academia Press, 2009, pp. 73-105 (see pp. 79-81 
for Romboutswerve). 
29. Bas Van Bavel, “People and Land: Rural Population Developments and Property 
Structures in the Low Countries, c. 1300-c. 1600”, Continuity & Change, 30 (2002), pp. 9-37: 30.
30. Discussed in Wim Blockmans, Walter Prevenier, The Promised Lands. The Low 
Countries under Burgundian Rule, 1369-1530, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1999, pp. 168-173.
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Bavel rightly argues that, for these former peasants, the prospects for regaining or 
increasing one’s social standing were grim. Whether they sold their labor in the 
towns or in the countryside, opportunities for wealth accumulation were limited, 
and concerted efforts to improve their position were absent.31 For the winners 
of this progressive economic polarization, the social consequences are not so 
clear. There was of course the emergence of a rural bourgeoisie of well-to-do 
peasants, farmers, and a corollary group of stewards, foremen, clerks, and so on, 
who enjoyed great purchase power. Yet, the ways in which this diverse group 
could profile itself socially was apparently shaped by the strategies of higher-
ranking elites. The contrasting examples of Flanders, Guelders, and Frisia – three 
principalities with hotbeds of agrarian capitalism – show two very different 
developments. In Flanders, the nobility had opened up its marriage networks 
towards the urban elites, who had matching wealth and power, and, increasingly 
often, matching investment portfolios of large rural estates. As a result, it became 
increasingly difficult for the growing number of wealthy farmers in Coastal 
Flanders to join the ranks of the nobility by way of marriage. Confronted with this 
glass ceiling, the rural bourgeoisie became a self-contained group, that became 
increasingly recognized as a distinct, second-tier rural elite by contemporaries.32 
The tastes of the nobility of Guelders, however, were not so radically urban, and 
its marriage networks remained more permeable vis-à-vis prominent commoners 
on the countryside. The so-called hoofdelingen of Frisia (the local nobility) were 
also open to the new milieu of gentlemen-farmers that emerged when commercial 
agriculture developed.33 In these two regions, the rural bourgeoisie is likely to 
have cultivated a social limbo in the pursuit of noble status.
A discussion of the prime movers of economic and social change in the Low 
Countries by means of the shorthand concepts of a Smithian urban historiography 
and a Neo-Marxist rural historiography has undoubtedly shortchanged the 
position of many, if not most, individual scholars.34 Yet, this survey reveals that 
social mobility is increasingly understood from the entanglements between town 
and countryside, and that the measure in which the increased prosperity of one 
group translated into increased social standing was shaped by the interests of 
other groups. Above all, this survey shows that historians all agree that, both in 
town and countryside, middling classes proliferated between the aristocracy and 
the peasantry. We now turn to these groups.
31. Van Bavel, Manors and Markets, pp. 275-276.
32. Frederik Buylaert, Andy Ramandt, “The Transformation of Rural Elites in Late 
Medieval Flanders. Oligarchy, State Formation and Social Change in the Liberty of Bruges (ca. 
1350 - ca. 1525)”, Continuity & Change, 30 (2015), pp. 39-69.
33. For the rural outlook of noblemen in Guelders, see Conrad Gietman, Republiek van adel. 
Eer in de Oost-Nederlandse adelscultuur (1555-1702), Utrecht, Gruting, 2010. For Frisia: Paul 
Noomen, “De Friese vetemaatschappij: sociale structuur en machtsbases”, in Fryslân, staat en 
macht 1450-1650, ed. by Johan Frieswijk et al., Hilversum, Verloren, 1999, pp. 43-64: 51-52. 
34. That is not to say that this interpretation of the historiography is uncommon. This view 
is already articulated briefly in various contributions to the debate that followed the publication 
of Manors and Markets (published in The Low Countries Journal of Social and Economic 
History 8 (2011), pp. 61-138; see esp. p. 73 and pp. 114-116).
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3. Social mobility and the middle classes
Our understanding of the positions and prospects of the new social groups 
that emerged since the high Middle Ages is shaped by two debates that are not 
limited to the Low Countries, but the Low Countries figure prominently in them. 
One addresses the experiences of paid laborers, and another the organization of 
urban craft guilds and its impact on society.
First, we focus on the long-standing discussion whether there was a “Golden 
Age of Labor” in the late Middle Ages. This debate is important for the Low 
Countries for the simple reason that, here, wage labor was an exceptionally 
frequent phenomenon. By 1500, about one-third of all labor in the Low Countries 
was wage labor, a figure that is higher than in most other parts of Northwestern 
Europe.35 The “Golden Age of Labor”-hypothesis goes back to the eighteenth 
century and proceeds from the argument that the mass mortality of the Black 
Death from the 1350s onwards caused the grain prices to drop because of declining 
demand, while labor shortages provoked a significant rise in wages. Inversely, 
the demographic recovery that set in in Western Europe from the second half of 
the fifteenth century would have ended this high-wage regime. This view pushed 
historians to reconstruct the evolution of prices and wages, which revealed that, in 
the fifteenth century, real wages did increase up to a fivefold, reaching levels that 
were only matched again five centuries later.36 Yet, whether there was a temporary 
improvement in the social position of laborers remains a matter of debate. This 
thesis is not so much abandoned as qualified, in that historians now endorse the 
view that trends in real income diverged wildly between various regions, and 
between various types of laborers. 
Even if one accepts the basic premises of this (neo-)Malthusian model, it 
clearly does not hold for every part of Europe, including some parts of the Low 
Countries. The duchy of Brabant, for example, was hardly touched by the plague, 
and here, the increase in nominal wages is not attributed to labor shortages, but 
to institutional factors such as monetary policies and developments in urban 
markets.37 More importantly, the parts of the Low Countries that were hit hard by 
the Black Death were remarkably resilient. The towns of Flanders and Holland, 
for example, did not see the extreme demographic decline that is noted for many 
Italian towns. They recovered rather quickly, presumably because they continued 
to attract large numbers of immigrants. This recovery may have precluded the 
labor shortages that supposedly pushed the rise of nominal wages. 
35. Van Bavel, Manors and Markets, p. 204.
36. Robert Allen, Jacob Weisdorf, “Was There an ‘Industrious Revolution’ before the 
Industrial Revolution?”, Economic History Review, 64 (2011), pp. 715-729. For considerations 
of space, it is not possible to provide a full overview for the Low Countries. The seminal 
publications are Nicolaas Posthumus, Nederlandsche prijsgeschiedenis, Leiden, Brill, 1943-
1964 and Dokumenten voor de geschiedenis van prijzen en lonen in Vlaanderen en Brabant, ed. 
by Charles Verlinden and Etienne Scholliers, 4 vols., Brugge, De Tempel, 1959-1973.
37. Herman Van der Wee, “Prices and Wages as Development Variables: A Comparison 
Between England and the Southern Netherlands, 1400-1700”, Acta Historiae Neerlandicae, 10 
(1978), pp. 58-78.
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The “Golden Age of Labor” may also have been thrown into doubt by local 
trends in the labor regime. Many data sets focus on daily wages of building or 
harvest workers that ignore the actual days worked per year, while employment 
was in fact highly irregular. An increase in real wages may have been offset by 
underemployment or an increase in leisure time. For the Low Countries, where 
data are scarce, estimates for the length of the average working year range 
between 200 and 270 days,38 but Herman Van der Wee has stressed the significant 
fluctuations behind these averages. In Antwerp and its environs, the number of 
working days dropped to 191 days during the civil war the 1480s, and peaked to 
260 days during Antwerp’s efflorescence in the 1540s and 1550s.39 Other factors 
too, could buffer the impact of trends in real wages. The debate focuses on the 
income of male wage earners, but households are a more relevant unit of study 
because its income often exceeded the earnings of its male head.40 Information on 
the contribution of women and minors is lacking, but many households in town 
and countryside had small plots of land that provided additional income in the 
form of fruit, vegetables, and so on.
Next to this, structural differences existed between different groups. For the Low 
Countries, scholars mainly focus on the difference between skilled and unskilled 
laborers (the so-called skill premium). As a reaction to labor shortages and declining 
interest rates after the Black Death, the skill premium declined in the whole of 
Europe. When the population recovered, the premium increased steadily in southern 
Europe but remained relatively stable in the Low Countries thanks to favorable 
conditions for human capital formation, such as a well-functioning capital markets 
and a high number of schools. In this respect, the unskilled workers probably gained 
the most. Not only did they witnessed a substantial rise in real wages, institutional 
factors also made schooling more accessible to a broader layer of society. This trend 
was pronounced in sixteenth-century Holland, where the skill premium was lower 
than elsewhere.41 In this county, wages also resisted the sixteenth-century decline in 
wages, presumably because of increasing labor productivity.42 
38. See for example Etienne Scholliers, Loonarbeid en honger, de levensstandaard in de 
XVe en XVIe eeuw te Antwerpen, Antwerp, De Sikkel, 1960, vol. 1, pp. 84-92; Leo Noordegraaf, 
Hollands welvaren? Levensstandaard in Holland 1450-1650, Bergen, Octavo, 1985, pp. 58-61; 
Wim Blockmans, Walter Prevenier, “Poverty in Flanders and Brabant from the Fourteenth to 
the Mid-Sixteenth Century: Sources and Problems”, Acta Historiae Neerlandicae, 10 (1978), 
pp. 20-57: 24.
39. Herman Van der Wee, The Growth of the Antwerp Market and the European Economy 
Fourteenth-Sixteenth Centuries, The Hague, Nijhof, 1963, vol. 1, pp. 540-544.
40. Jeremy Goldberg, “Household and the Organisation of Labour in Late Medieval 
Towns”, in The Household in Late Medieval Cities: Italy and Northwestern Europe Compared, 
ed. by Myriam Carlier and Tim Soens, Leuven, Garant, 2001, pp. 59-70.
41. Jan Luiten van Zanden, “The Skill Premium and the ‘Great Divergence’”, European 
Review of Economic History, 13 (2009), pp. 121-153 and Şevket Pamuk, “The Black Death 
and the Origins of the ‘Great Divergence’ across Europe, 1300-1600”, European Review of 
Economic History, 11 (2007), pp. 289-317: 301-304.
42. Jan de Vries, The Dutch Rural Economy in the Golden Age, 1500-1700, New Haven, 
Yale University Press, 1974.
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Lastly, scholars question the Malthusian assumption that late medieval labor 
markets were already free from non-economic pressures. In the Low Countries, the 
bonds between employers and employees differed greatly from region to region, and 
these relations decisively shaped the extent to which laborers could improve their 
lot. Rural laborers in the Guelders Riverlands, for instance, were mostly proletarians 
who received a regularly payment, whereas in Inland Flanders, they were mostly 
small peasants who still had a personal bond with their employer. Aside from an 
additional income, the larger farms also provided the workers with capital through 
the sharing of horses and ploughs. The potential gain from increases in nominal 
wages was probably limited since laborers were partially paid in services and also 
because wage negotiations were determined by the reciprocal relations between 
large estates and small peasant holdings.43 Similar filters can also be noted for urban 
labor markets. Guild restrictions on labor had a profound impact on the potential 
gains of increased wages, and in towns where craft guilds were strong, laborers 
may have negotiated more effectively for higher wages than in towns where craft 
guilds were weak. Also, within a town, various segments of the labor market each 
had different strengths and weaknesses when laborers defended their interests. 
Traditionally, the “Golden Age of Labor”-hypothesis has been investigated by 
charting the evolution in real wages in the building industries, but recent research 
for the Brabantine town of ‘s Hertogenbosch revealed that the decreasing real wages 
for building laborers in the sixteenth century was not mirrored by a decline in per 
capita income for the majority of the urban population.44 Less organized crafts such 
as the building industries were more vulnerable for cutbacks in nominal wages, 
and, inversely, John Munro has argued that the initial rise of nominal wages in the 
late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries was mainly the result of so-called wage 
stickiness in deflationary times.45 Established power relations had a decisive impact 
on the bargaining position of groups that were temporarily favored by the winds of 
demographic and economic change.
At this point, the growing attention to the institutional boundaries of the arena 
for wage negotiations ties in with the second debate that shapes our understanding 
of the experiences of middle classes, namely the discussion about social mobility 
and craft guilds. Unlike what was the case in much of the German Empire, for 
example, craft guilds were a distinctly urban phenomenon in the Low Countries. 
Moving from south to north, the organization of specific professions in guilds 
with obligatory membership followed the general pattern of urbanization. Craft 
43. Van Bavel, Manors and Markets, pp. 205-213; Erik Thoen, Tim Soens, “The Family 
or the Farm: A Sophie’s Choice? The Late Medieval Crisis in Flanders”, in Crisis in the Later 
Middle Ages. Beyond the Postan-Duby Paradigm, ed. by John Drendel, Turnhout, Brepols, 
2015, pp. 195-224. 
44. Bruno Blondé, Jord Hanus, “Beyond Building Craftsmen. Economic Growth and 
Living Standards in the Sixteenth-Century Low Countries: The Case of ‘S-Hertogenbosch 
(1500-1560)”, European Review of Economic History, 14 (2010), pp. 179-207.
45. John Munro, “Wage Stickiness, Monetary Changes, and Real Incomes in Late-
Medieval England and the Low Countries, 1300-1500: Did Money Matter?”, Research in 
Economic History, 21 (2003), pp. 185-297.
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guilds were established in large numbers in the towns of Flanders, Hainaut, and 
Liège between 1100 and 1400, and then in Brabantine towns, where this process 
continued up to the start of the Dutch Revolt in 1567. In the northbound provinces 
of Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht, and Guelders, most towns only boomed from 
the fourteenth century onwards, and here, craft guilds emerged in the fifteenth, 
sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries.46 
As a corollary of these different trajectories, the position of craft guilds in 
society differed significantly from region to region. In the southern provinces 
of the Low Countries, the emerging craft guilds had cornered virtually all 
important industries. In the larger towns, they had also considerable political 
power: at the turn of the fourteenth century, craftsmen had claimed seats in the 
bench of aldermen of Liège, Brussels, Mechelen, Ghent, Bruges, Leuven, and so 
on, a privilege that they usually managed to cling to until the late fifteenth and 
sixteenth century. Barring Dordrecht, Utrecht, Middelburg, and Zwolle, where 
craftsmen had representatives in the city council until ca. 1530, the guilds of the 
northern provinces never acquired political rights. Also, labor was less subject to 
restrictions in the northern provinces, since many industries that contributed to the 
seventeenth-century “Dutch Miracle” were not guilded, or only had guilds with 
weak regulations or limited means to enforce them.47
Socially speaking, the key question about the ca. 1250 craft guilds that are 
attested for the towns of the Low Countries before the Dutch Revolt is whether 
guilds were conducive to social mobility for its members or not. In a seminal paper 
that proceeds from evidence from the early modern German Empire, Christopher 
Friedrichs has pointed out that – in contrast to modern professions, which usually 
carry a distinct social cachet, up to the point that sociologists use professions to 
measure social mobility and social stratification – craft guilds were not necessarily 
coherent social bodies. From the start, there were great discrepancies in wealth 
between the various members of a single profession, and, more importantly, these 
discrepancies were not yet structural: with the passing of the generations, wealthy 
craftsmen often saw their fortunes plummet, whereas poorer craftsmen had a 
reasonable chance at improving their lot. As master craftsmen shared privileges and 
access to markets for the acquisition of raw produce as well as for the distribution 
of finished goods, their life trajectories were quite equally subject to time and 
chance. Craft guilds only became less heterogeneous and volatile when this level 
playing field was overturned by individuals who cornered access to resources 
and markets at the expense of the majority of the craftsmen. Entrepreneurs could 
force master craftsmen to give up their independence by subjecting those masters 
to putting-out systems, in which these craftsmen only had access to resources, 
46. Bert De Munck, Piet Lourens, Jan Lucassen, “The Establishment and Distribution 
of Craft Guilds in the Low Countries, 1100-1800”, in Craft Guilds in the Early Modern Low 
Countries: Work, Power and Representation, ed. by Maarten Prak, Catharina Lis, Jan Lucassen 
and Hugo Soly, Aldershot, Ashgate Publishing, 2005, pp. 32-73 (see esp. Table 2.1).
47. Karel Davids, “Apprenticeship and Guild Control in the Netherlands, c. 1450-1800”, 
in Learning on the Shop Floor. Historical Perspectives on Apprenticeship, ed. by Bert De 
Munck, Steven Kaplan and Hugo Soly, New York, Berghahn books, 2007, pp. 65-84.
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markets, or tools if they agreed to sell their finished product at a suboptimal 
price to the entrepreneur who controlled the supply of those resources, the access 
to those markets, or the capital necessary to buy those tools. In consequence, 
the community of craftsmen bifurcated in two distinct social layers, namely an 
increasingly prominent upper middle class or bourgeoisie, and an economically 
dependent lower middle class that still owned sufficient property to distinguish 
themselves of the proletariat, but that no longer had realistic hopes at social 
advancement.48
These processes can certainly be observed for various craft guilds all over 
the Low Countries, but historians disagree about what was the dominant trend in 
the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries. For each century, historians find 
examples of subcontracting and pauperization, especially for the textile and building 
industries, but what is not clear is whether these examples reveal the exception 
or the norm.49 Some historians argue that, in Netherlandish towns, subcontracting 
was held at bay by the urban authorities. Understanding that progressive social 
polarization among the middle classes could undermine public order and, later 
on, that impoverished craftsmen might be susceptible to socially reformist 
strands of the Reformation (e.g. Anabaptism), the urban political elite supposedly 
enforced regulations that protected petty master-craftsmen. By securing access 
to distant markets, by putting price caps on raw materials that were crucial for a 
given sector (e.g. wool for textile workers), and so on, they precluded the rise of 
entrepreneurialism. The result was a stable system in which the economic viability 
of individual workshops was more or less guaranteed, at least until well into the 
sixteenth century.50 Other historians, however, explain such measures precisely 
as indications that subcontracting took hold in the urban economy. Merchant-
entrepreneurs would have used their influence with the town’s aldermen – insofar 
as they were not aldermen themselves – to block leading craftsmen who tried to 
set themselves up as entrepreneurs at the expense of smaller craftsmen, simply 
because those merchants were exploiting the small masters themselves.51 In this 
view, urban communities were not shaped by the wish to preserve the standing 
48. Christopher Friedrichs, “Capitalism, Mobility and Class Formation in the Early 
Modern German City”, Past & Present, 60 (1975), pp. 24-49.
49. For the building sector, see the seminal Jean-Pierre Sosson, Les travaux publics de la 
ville de Bruges, XIVe-XVe siècles, Brussels, Crédit communal de Belgique, 1977 and Hugo Soly, 
Urbanisme en kapitalisme te Antwerpen in de 16de eeuw: de stedebouwkundige en industriële 
ondernemingen van Gilbert van Schoonbeke, Antwerp, Gemeentekrediet van België, 1977. The 
textile sector is extensively discussed in the references cited in the following two footnotes.
50. This is most cogently argued in Robert DuPlessis, Martha Howell, “Reconsidering 
the Early Modern Economy: the Cases of Leiden and Lille”, Past & Present, 94 (1982), pp. 
49-84.
51. See in particular the critique on DuPlessis and Howell in Catharina Lis, Hugo Soly, 
“Subcontracting in Guild-based Export Trades, Thirteenth-Eighteenth Centuries”, in Guilds, 
Innovation, and the European Economy, 1400-1800, ed. by Stephan Epstein and Maarten 
Prak, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2008, pp. 81-113: 101-110. In the northern 
provinces, were guilds were politically weak, subcontracting was usually introduced by 
merchant-entrepreneurs. In the southern provinces, guilds had sufficient leverage with the 
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of the middling sort of craftsman as the master of his workshop and household. 
Rather, those communities resembled a Potemkin village. Households remained 
independent in name only, as they were all increasingly tied together by invisible 
strings of obligation to a handful of entrepreneurs.
The debate is undecided to this day, largely because of a lack of sources. 
Whereas the rise of agrarian capitalism has left a paper trail in the form of sold 
farmsteads, pre-industrial urban capitalism may have left few traces. There 
was no need to force craftsmen out of their homes and workshops: before the 
Industrial Revolution, it was not necessary, and often counterproductive, to 
concentrate production in factories. Also, few private archives of merchants and 
wealthy craftsmen has survived, and none of petty craftsmen, making impossible 
to investigate financial relations between them.
Perhaps one way forward is the renewed interest in social inequality. 
As craftsmen constituted a considerable segment of a town’s population (in 
sixteenth-century Ghent, ca. 15-20 per cent of the town’s inhabitants belonged 
to a craft guild),52 it stands to reason that measures of social inequality at least 
partially reflect trends within corporate milieus, and the estimates that are 
currently available are suggestive. Proceeding from the estimated value of 
houses, registered for fiscal purposes, as a proxy for inequality, the analysis of 
Wouter Ryckbosch reveals that in the few towns for which data are available 
(mainly Bruges and ‘s Hertogenbosch), inequality was high in the thirteenth and 
fourteenth centuries, mirroring the predominance of a low-wage economy that 
was as yet largely unregulated. Possibly helped along by a Golden Age of Labor, 
the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries saw a decline in inequality, since, in the 
southern provinces in particular, urban society was restructured along the lines 
of a high-wage economy that was strongly regulated by guilds that apparently 
offered craftsmen sufficient protection against aspiring entrepreneurs. Inequality 
became very high again in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which 
suggests that subcontracting and the concomitant stratification between capital-
rich entrepreneurs and capital-poor petty craftsmen only became the dominant 
trend in the course of the sixteenth century.53 Barring exceptions, prospects at 
up- and downward social mobility may have been better in most guilds of late 
medieval towns than in earlier and later eras. 
If it is plausible that the craft guilds have, at least for some time, buttressed 
the social standing of an important segment of the urban middle classes, it is 
also plausible that the corporate organization of the urban economy has pushed 
women down the social ladder. Much suggests that the position of women on the 
public authorities to block attempts of merchants to reorganize the production process. Here, 
subcontracting was usually introduced by ambitious craftsmen.
52. Johan Dambruyne, Corporatieve middengroepen: aspiraties, relaties en transforma-
ties in de 16de-eeuwse Gentse ambachtswereld, Ghent, Academia Press, 2001, pp. 39-41 and 
722-723.
53. Wouter Ryckbosch, “Economic Inequality and Growth before the Industrial 
Revolution: the Case of the Low Countries (Fourteenth to Nineteenth Centuries)”, European 
Review of Economic History, 20 (2015), pp. 1-22.
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labor market became more restricted over time. In the twelfth- and thirteenth-
century Southern Low Countries, normative sources frequently refer to both 
men and women in respect to a wide range of professions (e.g. “drapiers” and 
“drapieres” in Middle French or “piners” and “pineressen” in Middle Dutch), 
but such references became rarer when craft guilds emerged that were bent on 
cornering many professions for men.54 Similar trends are observed for the rise of 
the guilds in the towns of the fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Holland, up to the 
point that women were sometimes explicitly barred from guild membership.55 
Perhaps the participation of women did not so much decline per se, but became 
more camouflaged: rather than appearing in the sources as independent actors, 
they would contribute as important members of the household and workshop of 
the male masters to whom they were married. Yet, in the course of the late Middle 
Ages, both the legal framework and the ideology of the “good household” assumed 
more patriarchal characteristics, often protecting the interests of the family at the 
detriment of women.56 This trend was counterbalanced to a certain extent by the 
rise of markets for paid labor, as many women now worked for a couple of years as 
domestic servants in urban households or farmsteads. While data on demographic 
trends and on the wage gap between men and women are scarce, some historians 
have speculated that plague-induced labor shortages may have led to wages that 
were sufficiently high for women to increase their independence from their own 
family and that of a prospective husband, and to postpone or to avoid marriage 
altogether.57 
What is certainly correct is that women continued to participate in the 
economy, as widows of deceased masters, or independently in specific sectors, 
ranging from poorly paid spinning to more lucrative positions in retail trade 
or moneylending.58 Women also remained active on the market for urban real 
estate, although their position deteriorated over time: whereas in many parts of 
fourteenth-century Brussels, women held ca. 20 per cent of all properties burdened 
with a cijns (a type of annuity), but their share was closer to 10 per cent in the 
mid-fifteenth century.59 All things considered, the deteriorating position of women 
54. Ellen Kittel, Kurt Queller, “‘Whether Man or Woman …’ Gender Inclusivity in the 
Town Ordinances of Medieval Douai”, Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies, 30 
(2000), pp. 63-100 (this pattern is also revealed for Ypres in a working paper by Peter Stabel 
(Antwerp University). We are indebted to the author for a preview).
55. Van Bavel, Manors and Markets, pp. 207-211 and 292-294, which provides a 
discussion of the literature.
56. See in particular Martha Howell, Women, Production and Patriarchy in Late Medieval 
Cities, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984 and Martha Howell, Commerce before 
Capitalism in Europe, 1300-1600, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 93-144.
57. Tine De Moor, Jan Luiten van Zanden, “Girl Power: the European Marriage Pattern 
and Labour Markets in the North Sea Region in the Late Medieval and Early Modern Period”, 
Economic History Review, 63 (2010), pp. 1-33.
58. See especially Shennan Hutton, Women and Economic Activities in Late Medieval 
Ghent, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.
59. Andrea Bardyn, “Vermogende vrouwen. Het vastgoedbezit van vrouwen in laatmiddel-
eeuws Brussel op basis van cijnsregisters (1356-1460)”, Stadsgeschiedenis, 9 (2014), pp. 1-24.
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may have been the most important process of downward social mobility that took 
shape in the late medieval Low Countries, rivalled only in sheer numbers by the 
pauperization of entire peasant communities in some regions.
4. Social mobility and the rise of states
The last line of enquiry is whether the rise of the state in the medieval Low 
Countries engendered social mobility, which is also subject to controversy. 
What is beyond dispute is that some opportunities for upward social mobility 
presented themselves when the Low Countries became covered with a patchwork 
of independent principalities. In the entourage of the various dukes and counts, 
there was a growing need for technical expertise. At first, princes relied on 
services provided by clerics, but from the late twelfth century onwards – at least 
in the precociously organized county of Flanders – they came to employ full-
time clerks, stewards, bookkeepers, receivers, bailiffs, and so on. This process 
was reinforced in the course of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, when the 
successive Burgundian and Habsburg rulers created additional offices to manage 
the Netherlandish principalities that they had strung together under their rule. 
For some, a career in this emerging bureaucratic milieu was a vehicle for 
social promotion. Sometimes, these success stories even involve individuals of 
illegitimate birth, another group that was progressively stigmatized over time, 
next to women, vagrants, and gypsies. The “bastard”-born Jheronimus Lauwerein 
(d. 1509), for example, managed to claw his way up from the fringes of the 
Bruges bourgeoisie to the top of the Habsburg financial administration, acquiring 
sufficient land and lordship in the process to entrench his offspring in the ranks 
of the nobility. Such examples underpin the claim, iterated in one of the most 
recent monographs on the Burgundian-Habsburg polity, that state formation gave 
a strong push to the urban bourgeoisie, while undermining the nobility.60
This view has old roots in grand narratives about the collapse of the feudal 
order and the rise of modern urban society, but it jars with a spate of recent studies 
on Netherlandish nobilities. In fact, the Low Countries fit into a pattern that is 
typical for the European continent, in which princes shared control over the state 
with segments of the nobility in return for much-needed resources (credit, military 
expertise, and so on). Consequently, states developed in ways that only rarely 
threatened the interests of established elites, who, in turn, were happy to use state 
offices to shore up private fortunes and lordship.61 In various ways, this process 
precluded social mobility, rather than enabling it. Whereas it was not uncommon, 
for example, in fourteenth-century Flanders for commoners to join the nobility by 
serving as a bailiff to the count of Flanders, this became very rare when, in the 
60. Robert Stein, De hertog en zijn Staten. De eenwording van de Bourgondische Ne-
derlanden, ca. 1380-1480, Hilversum, Verloren, 2014, pp. 274-275 (an English translation is 
forthcoming).
61. For a concise introduction: Hillay Zmora, Monarchy, Aristocracy and the State in 
Europe, 1300-1800, London, Routledge, 2001.
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fifteenth century, the lucrative office of bailiff was monopolized by established 
nobles. A similar outcome can be observed for the county of Zeeland. The 
unification of the Low Countries under Burgundian-Habsburg rule reinforced the 
penchant of nobles to marry with nobles from neighboring principalities, rather 
than with commoners from their home region, and by the early sixteenth century, 
the nobility of Zeeland largely consisted of lineages whose main residences were 
situated in Flanders, Brabant, or Holland. Obviously, absentee lordship made it 
difficult for wealthy commoners from Zeeland to gain access to noble milieus.62
Also, state service did not as much for the lower ranks of the bourgeoisie than 
over-studied success stories such as that of Jheronimus Lauwerein suggest. Studies 
of the higher echelons of the administration reveal that – next to ca. one-third to 
about half of the officials who were noble – most officials came from families that 
were already very prominent in their hometown or shire, precisely because princes 
recruited individuals that not only displayed bureaucratic aptitudes, but also had 
patrimonial resources – private power, wealth, and social networks – that could be put 
to use for the prince.63 As a rule, established elites effectively cornered opportunities 
that came with the rise of the state at the expense of lower-ranking groups.
The true importance of states for social mobility is situated with war and 
taxes. On the one hand, the involvement of the Low Countries in foreign wars led 
to mounting fiscal pressures on Netherlandish subjects. In fifteenth-century Ypres, 
taxes claimed ca. 17-29 per cent of the income of a mason.64 This process may 
also have contributed to the progressive pauperization of peasant communities, 
not in the least because, in many provinces, representative bodies were dominated 
by towns that were prone to shunt fiscal burdens to the countryside. On the 
other hand, warfare also had a direct impact on society. Apart from wars with 
English, French, and German princes, the Low Countries saw frequent and violent 
confrontations rulers and subjects. We already referred to the prime example that 
is the rise of agrarian capitalism in Holland in the wake of the Dutch Revolt. Yet, 
caution is in order. Both Inland Flanders and Coastal Flanders were often ravaged 
by the repression of revolts, but both regions developed differently, with a decline 
of the peasantry in Coastal Flanders that was absent in Inland Flanders. The ways 
in which towns and regions could pick up the pieces after a crisis differed strongly, 
and ongoing research must as yet reveal what decided that old patterns were re-
established or replaced by new ones.65
62. See Buylaert, Eeuwen van ambitie, pp. 189-204 and Arie van Steensel, Edelen in 
Zeeland. Macht, rijkdom en status in een laatmiddeleeuwse samenleving, Hilversum, Verloren, 
2010.
63. This is most cogently argued in Jan Dumolyn, Staatsvorming en vorstelijke ambtenaren 
in het graafschap Vlaanderen (1419-1477), Antwerp, Garant, 2003, pp. 150-157.
64. Calculated in Wim Blockmans, “Finances publiques et inégalité sociale dans les Pays-
Bas aux XIVe-XVIe siècles”, in Genèse de l’État moderne: prélèvement et redistribution, ed. by 
Jean-Philippe Genet and Michel Le Mené, Paris, Éditions du Centre national de la recherche 
scientifique, 1988, pp. 77-90: 89.
65. This is the subject of the ERC-Research project of Bas van Bavel (Coordinating for 
Life. Success and Failure of Western European Societies in Coping with Rural Hazards and 
Disasters, 1300-1800) (2014-2019).
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Another challenge that lies ahead for historians of social mobility is 
seigneurial lordship. The birth of independent principalities in the Low Countries 
appears to have happened in tandem with a proliferation of territorial claims to 
lordship on the local level. The emergence of a class of lords, on whose shoulders 
much of the claims to power of dukes and counts must have rested, came with 
a thorough reshuffle of established hierarchies. Aspiring commoners now 
challenged the authority of ecclesiastical institutions in attempts to carve out a 
private kingdom that would greatly increase their social standing.66 Perhaps these 
attempts were more often successful than not, because in the late Middle Ages, 
seigneurial lordship was a frequent phenomenon, even in principalities where it 
was relatively weak. Flanders, where seigneurial authority was crushed between 
the powerful towns and a strong prince, counted more than 800 seigneuries by the 
turn of the sixteenth century. Even Holland, where lordship never has mattered 
much, had more than 500 seigneuries.67 With the passing of time, the jurisdiction 
of the seigneurie may have waned (its economic importance certainly did), but 
the question remains whether the thousands of individuals that, over the course 
of centuries, have implemented seigneurial rule as the lord’s bailiff, steward, or 
alderman have enjoyed an increase in status because of such offices. As we have 
seen earlier, quite a few members of the first urban elites came from this milieu, 
which suggests that seigneurial officials were socially mobile. In sheer numbers, 
the making of polities on the local level must have mattered far more for social 
mobility than the better-studied world of the princely administration. 
5. Conclusion
Earlier research on social mobility in the 1960s and 1970s largely failed 
because the topic’s treatment was subsumed by the aspiration to stratigraphic 
views on entire societies and the corollary assumption that a focus on economic 
hierarchies – and the movements of individuals and groups on those hierarchies 
– was sufficient to write the history of social hierarchies and social mobility. 
Today, social inequality claims the spotlight rather than social stratification. Yet, 
the discussions sketched in this essay suggests that, perhaps, not so much has 
changed, because – at least to the authors of this essay – it is not easy nor opportune 
to disentangle the issue of social mobility from the adjoining, but distinct debates 
about economic inequality and economic change.
Precisely because our understanding of social mobility is shaped in a very 
direct way by claims about how medieval economies worked and how this shaped 
66. An incisive discussion in Steven Vanderputten, “Fulcard’s Pigsty: Cluniac Reformers, 
Dispute Settlement, and the Lower Aristocracy in Early Twelfth-Century Flanders”, Viator, 38 
(2007), pp. 91-115.
67. The estimate for Flanders is provided by Miet Adriaens (Vrije Universiteit Brussel 
and Katholieke Universiteit Leuven), who prepares a doctoral dissertation on this topic. For 
Holland, see Maarten Prins, “Heren van Holland. Het bezit van Hollandse heerlijkheden onder 
adel en patriciaat (1500-1795)”, Virtus, 22 (2015), pp. 37-62.
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the social fabric, and vice versa, social mobility is one of those themes that brings 
into focus the strengths and limitations of current scholarship on medieval society. 
In this sense, it is striking that, for the Low Countries, most debates are unresolved. 
Optimists might cling to the maxim that scholars only need to worry if everyone 
is in agreement, as consensus stymies the development of new questions and the 
search for new data. If true, then Netherlandish historiography is in excellent 
shape. Pessimists, however, might argue with Marcus Aurelius that the judgement 
of future generations will not be of greater moment than that of earlier ones, as 
these debates are premeditated on conflicting theoretical assumptions that are 
difficult, if not impossible, to test with the available sources. 
While we do not know how much light will come from all this heat, the 
comparative study of the Low Countries as a “laboratory of history” suggests that 
the concept of path-dependency is a fruitful lens to study social mobility. In two 
regions, similar trends might create similar economic groups that nevertheless 
develop very different social profiles if existing social groups respond differently 
to these newcomers. If attempts at assimilation with higher-ranking groups are 
rebuffed, newcomers were forced to develop a collective identity that in turn 
shaped the options of those on lower rungs of the social ladder. If attempts at 
assimilation were welcomed, then this created different, more fluid scenarios. A 
modest, but effective approach might be to focus on specific groups and to study 
their marriage ties – an excellent proxy for bonding between different milieus – to 
make “social maps” of different regions.68 
When we know whether specific groups were shunned or embraced by 
neighboring groups on the marriage market, comparative analysis may reveal 
the root causes of different or similar patterns in various regions. Group-specific 
approaches are sufficiently efficient to investigate whether these causes were 
situated in the realm of economics (e.g. different income portfolio’s), politics (e.g. 
a government system in which craft guilds and high bourgeoisie shared power 
or not), or social and cultural norms and actions (e.g. shared or divergent beliefs 
or tastes). This approach can, one may hope, reveal how, over time, cumulative 
choices set patterns of social interactions that in turn decided which forms of 
social mobility became structural trends, and which ones were doomed to remain 
exceptional.
68. The use of marriage patterns to map social networks and the interactions between 
groups was also developed in the first wave of postwar social history. See Roland Mousnier, La 
plume, la faucille et le marteau. Institutions et société en France du Moyen Age à la Révolution, 
Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1970, p. 14. 

